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are referred to in the main text of the paper.
A Trade Finance with Importer Bargaining Power
The model developed in the main text assumes that the exporter makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the
importer. This section explores the robustness of the model￿ s predictions to situations in which the importer
has some bargaining power in the initial negotiations. For simplicity, this section rules out the possibility
of misbehavior on the part of the exporter by assuming ￿X = 1, so that letters of credit are a dominated
￿nancing mode.
A.1 Exogenous Financing Costs
Whenever the costs of ￿nancing working capital requirements are exogenous, the choice of ￿nancing mode is
independent of the relative bargaining power of the exporter and the importer. Note that the total surplus
over which the exporter and the importer bargain over under a cash in advance contract is
￿CIA
ij =
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
1 + rj
R
￿
xCIA
j ;￿
￿
￿ ￿ijxCIA
j : (A.1)
Regardless of whether the exporter or the importer sets the quantity xCIA
j traded, this quantity maximizes
￿CIA
ij in (A.1), just as in the main text.
In a post shipment term transactions, the quantity xPST
j is set to maximize
￿PST
ij =
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
1 + ri
R(xj;￿) ￿ ￿ijxj: (A.2)
1Assume that in each of these cases, the exporter captures a share ￿ 2 [0;1) of this surplus, as opposed to a
share ￿ = 1 assumed in the main text.
Regardless of whether the exporter or the importer (or the two of them jointly) decides on the ￿nancing
terms for a particular transaction, it continues to be the case, just as in the main text, that cash in advance
terms are preferred to post shipment terms if and only if
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X
1 + rj
>
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
1 + ri
. (A.3)
Intuitively, the exporter and the importer can use the contracted price as a vehicle to transfer surplus
and thus there is no reason to distort the choice of ￿nancing terms in order to achieve the division of surplus
dictated by the relative bargaining strength of the agents.
A.2 Endogenous Financing Costs
Whenever ￿nancing costs are endogenous, matters become a bit more complicated because these ￿nancing
costs, and thus the relative pro￿tability of di⁄erent ￿nancing terms, might change endogenously with the
size of the required transfers. As shown below, however, this has little impact on the main results of the
paper.
Consider ￿rst the case of a cash in advance transaction. As before, the exporter obtains a share ￿ of the
gains from trade in (A.1), which implies that the initial transfer should be an amount equal to
PCIA
0;ij = ￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
1 + rj
R(xj;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ijxj.
The participation constraint of the local bank is the same as in the main text, i.e.,
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
PCIA
0 ￿
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)R(xj;￿). (A.4)
If the constraint binds, then the exporter receives a payo⁄ equal to
PCIA
0;ij ￿ ￿ijxj =
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
1 + ￿j
R(xj;￿) ￿ ￿ijxj; (A.5)
just as in the main text. The main di⁄erence is that the importer obtains a positive payo⁄ equal to
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
PCIA
0;ij ￿ ￿ijxj
￿
=
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
"
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
1 + ￿j
R(xj;￿) ￿ ￿ijxj
#
. (A.6)
Note, however, that regardless of whether the exporter or the importer sets the quantity xCIA
j traded, this
quantity maximizes the term in brackets on the right-hand-side of (A.6), just as in the main text.
If the local bank￿ s participation in (A.4) does not bind, a situation which is not possible when ￿ is close
enough to 1 but is possible for low enough ￿, then the cost of ￿nancing for the importer is equal to ￿j and
the payo⁄s to the exporter and importer are analogous to those derived under exogenous ￿nancing costs,
replacing rj with ￿j.
Consider next the case of post shipment terms. With general bargaining power, the payment from the
importer to the exporter at t = 2 is given by
PPST
1;ij = ￿
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
R(xj;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ri)￿ijxj:
2The exporter can only pledge a fraction ￿i +(1 ￿ ￿i)￿B of this payment to its local bank, and thus the level
of xj chosen by the exporter must satisfy
(1 + ￿i)￿ijxj ￿ (￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B)
￿
￿
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
R(xj;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ri)￿ijxj
￿
, (A.7)
where ￿i is the cost of funds in the exporting country.
For a su¢ ciently large ￿, this constraint does not bind when ￿i or ￿B are su¢ ciently large. When the
constraint (A.7) does not bind, as in the main text, the payo⁄s to the exporter and importer will be analogous
to those derived under exogenous ￿nancing costs, replacing ri with ￿i.
When the constraint binds, condition (A.7) will holds with equality and ri and xPST
j are jointly deter-
mined by this condition together with
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
1 + ri
R0 ￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿
= ￿ij
(remember that this ￿rst-order condition holds regardless of which agent decides on the quantity xPST
j being
transacted). Straightforward manipulations reveal
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B)
￿
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿ (1 + ￿i) = 1 + ri
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B)
1 + ￿i
R0 ￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿
=
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿ij, (A.8)
where ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
￿ xPST
j ￿ R0 ￿
xPST
j
￿
=R
￿
xPST
j
￿
is the elasticity of revenue with respect to the quantity
produced.
Now consider the determinants of the choice between the two payment methods, which is again governed
by condition (A.3), but with the ￿nancing costs ri and rj endogenously determined. There are four cases to
consider depending on whether the ￿nancing constraints (A.4) and (A.7) bind.
Case 1. When (A.4) binds but (A.7) does not, inequality (A.3), which provides the set of parameter values
under which cash in advance terms are preferred to post shipment terms, becomes
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X >
1 + ￿j
1 + ￿i
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
,
just as in the main text, and the results as in Propositions 1 and 2 of the main text are unchanged.
Case 2. When neither (A.4) nor (A.7) bind, the costs of ￿nancing are given by the technological parameters
￿i and ￿j and condition (A.3) reduces to
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X >
1 + ￿j
1 + ￿i
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
.
In this situation, the likelihood that a transaction occurs on cash in advance terms as opposed to post
shipment terms is decreasing in the institutional quality of the importing country (￿j) regardless of the
relative size of ￿X (￿ij) and ￿B (although the value of these parameters can a⁄ect whether the constraint
binds or not). Hence, the model continues to explain the empirically observed patterns. Furthermore,
Proposition 2 continues to hold.
3Case 3. When (A.4) and (A.7) both bind, inequality (A.3) becomes
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B
>
1 + ￿j
1 + ￿i
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿ : (A.9)
Comparative statics are here a bit more complicated in this case given the extra term with ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
. A ￿rst
point is that for a constant-elasticity function, R(x) = Ax￿, we have ￿(x) = ￿ for all x, which immediately
implies that the results in Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold. The revenue function is isoelastic whenever
the ￿rm faces a demand with constant price-elasticity, a common parameterization in the literature.
When ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
depends on xPST
j ; modi￿ed versions of main results in Proposition 1 and 2 can still be
obtained by putting more structure on the function ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
. For instance, if one makes the empirically
plausible assumption that ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
is weakly decreasing in xPST
j , as in the widely-used linear demand case,
then, as in Proposition 1, ￿B > ￿X (￿ij) is a su¢ cient condition for the likelihood that a transaction occurs
on cash in advance terms as opposed to post shipment terms to be decreasing in the institutional quality
￿j of the importing country.1 The reason for this is that, from equation (A.8), xPST
j is still necessarily
increasing in ￿j because the right-hand-side of (A.8) is decreasing in xPST
j , while the induced decrease in
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
makes it even less likely that condition (A.9) holds when ￿j rises. The main di⁄erence relative to
the main text is that ￿B > ￿X (￿ij) is no longer a necessary condition to explain the empirically observed
negative correlation between the use of post shipment terms and the institutional quality of the importing
country. In the empirically implausible case in which ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
were increasing in xPST
j , ￿B > ￿X (￿ij)
would no longer be su¢ cient to ensure a negative e⁄ect of institutional quality on the use of post shipment
terms. The derivations above imply, however, that the main results in the text continue to hold as long as
￿(x) does not increase in x too quickly.
(A.9) also implies that, as long as ￿(x) is su¢ ciently insensitive to x, the results in Proposition 2 hold
and the likelihood that a transaction occurs on cash in advance terms as opposed to post shipment terms is
increasing in the distance between the importing and exporting countries (￿ij), while the negative e⁄ect of
weak importer institutions on the expected relative pro￿tability of transactions that occur on post shipment
terms is alleviated by proximity between markets. The case in which the revenue function is isoelastic will
satisfy this condition.
Case 4. Finally, when constraint (A.4) does not bind but constraint (A.7) does bind, inequality (A.3)
becomes
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B
>
1 + ￿j
1 + ￿i
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿ ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿
￿
xPST
j
￿ : (A.10)
As in case 2 above, provided that ￿(x) is su¢ ciently insensitive to x, the likelihood that a transaction
occurs on cash in advance terms as opposed to post shipment terms is decreasing in the institutional quality
of the importing country (￿j) regardless of the relative size of ￿X (￿ij) and ￿B. Furthermore, as in case 3
above, this result extends to the empirically plausible case in which ￿(x) weakly decreases in x, given that
xPST
j is necessarily increasing in ￿j in that case (see equation (A.8)).
It is also clear from (A.9) that, as long as ￿(x) is su¢ ciently insensitive to x, the results in Proposition
2 continue to hold and the likelihood that a transaction occurs on cash in advance terms as opposed to post
shipment terms is increasing in the distance between the importing and exporting countries (￿ij), while the
1The case in which ￿
￿
xPST
j
￿
decreases in xPST
j corresponds to the case in which larger ￿rms tend to operate at a relatively
less elastic segment of their demand curves and are thus able to charge higher markups. For recent evidence, see Dhyne,
Emmanuel, Amil Petrin and FrØdŁric Warzynski (2012), ￿Prices, Markups and Productivity at the Firm-Product Level,￿
unpublished manuscript. Available at http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/Documents/2013/Dhyne,_Petrin_e_Warzynski_2012.pdf
4negative e⁄ect of weak importer institutions on the expected relative pro￿tability of transactions that occur
on post shipment terms is alleviated by proximity between markets. The case in which the revenue function
is isoelastic will satisfy this condition. It can also be shown that in the linear demand case, p = a ￿ bx, the
results in Proposition 2 are unaltered. To see this, note that plugging (A.8) into the above inequality (A.10),
leads to:
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X >
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
￿ij
R0 ￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿: (A.11)
In the linear demand case,
R0 (x) = a ￿ 2bx,
and thus the inequality becomes
￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X >
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
￿ij
a ￿ 2bxPST
j
:
Furthermore, in the linear case (A.8) reduces to
xPST
j =
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿a
￿b
￿
(1 + ￿i)￿ij
￿b
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B)
;
and thus (A.11) reduces to
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
 
2
￿
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿B)
￿
a￿ + 2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
￿ij
!
> 1:
This inequality is less likely to hold when ￿j is low or ￿ij is high, and the negative e⁄ect of ￿j on the
left-hand-side term is more pronounced the higher is ￿ij. In other words, the results in Proposition 2 apply
in this linear case, and the negative e⁄ect of weak importer institutions on the expected relative pro￿tability
of transactions that occur on post shipment terms is alleviated by proximity between markets.
A.3 Constraints on the Use of Prices to Transfer Surplus
As mentioned in the main text, some researchers (see, for example, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012)) have
suggested that ￿nancing terms might be a⁄ected by the relative bargaining power of the two transacting
agents for reasons orthogonal to relative ￿nancing costs. There does not appear to be any formal model of this
phenomenon. The general premise is that there are situations in which price setting can only imperfectly
transfer surplus between parties and that the choice of ￿nancing terms might constitute an alternative,
though second-best, way to transfer surplus. For instance, restrictions on price discrimination might forbid
sellers from charging lower prices to large and powerful buyers than to small and weak buyers, but perhaps
sellers can achieve higher surplus extraction in the latter case by demanding prepayment, while extending
credit to the larger and more powerful buyers. Empirically, there is little evidence that this alternative
bargaining power channel is operative in the data analyzed in the paper. As indicated in the text, buyers
who place larger orders or who are based in more concentrated markets are not more likely to transact on
post shipment terms.
For completeness, it is nevertheless informative to outline an extremely simple variant of the model that
introduces a constraint on the ability of the parties to transfer surplus using prices. This extension focuses
on the case of exogenous ￿nancing costs, and it con￿rms that powerful buyers are less likely to be asked to
pay in advance than weak buyers and that the other comparative statics obtained in the model continue to
hold.
5In order to limit the role of prices in redistributing surplus, one can introduce the constraint that the
exporter and importer receive exogenously given shares ￿ and 1￿￿ of sales revenue. With that assumption,
an exporter expects a pro￿t level equal to
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)￿R
￿
xCIA
j ;￿
￿
￿ ￿xCIA
j
in a cash in advance transaction, and equal to
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
￿R
￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿
1 + ri
￿ ￿xPST
j ,
with post shipment terms. It is then the case that if the exporter has relatively high bargaining power in the
sense that it can impose its preferred ￿nancing mode and volume of trade xPST
j , the exporter will choose
cash in advance terms whenever
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X) >
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
1 + ri
. (A.12)
The importer expects a pro￿t equal to
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)(1 ￿ ￿)R
￿
xCIA
j ;￿
￿
1 + rj
￿ ￿xCIA
j
when transacting on cash in advance terms, and equal to
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)R
￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿
￿ ￿xPST
j ,
when transacting on post shipment terms. It then follows that if the importer has relatively high bargaining
power in the sense that it can impose its preferred ￿nancing mode and volume of trade xCIA
j , the importer
will choose a cash in advance whenever
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
1 + rj
>
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
. (A.13)
Comparing inequalities (A.12) and (A.13) reveals that, regardless of the relative bargaining power of
the parties, a cash in advance transaction is relatively more attractive than a post shipment transaction
whenever ￿j is lower and whenever trade costs are higher. Furthermore, as in Proposition 2, the negative
e⁄ect of weak importer institutions on the expected relative pro￿tability of transactions that occur on post
shipment terms is alleviated by proximity between markets.
The main di⁄erence in this extension relative to the model in the paper is that if either ri or rj is
su¢ ciently high, it is possible that the parties might prefer di⁄erent modes of ￿nancing. Typically, the
exporter has a higher preference for cash in advance terms than for the post shipment terms, and the converse
is true for the importer. However, for certain parameter values, the exporter prefers cash in advance terms,
while the importer prefers post shipment terms. In the absence of other means to transfer utility, the actual
mode of ￿nancing might thus respond to the relative bargaining power of the agents.
6B Distance as Time
This section considers the possibility that distance a⁄ects the pro￿tability of a transaction by increasing the
time lag between the shipment and receipt of goods. More speci￿cally, suppose that goods arrive at the
importing country at time t = T, where T is an increasing function of distance, as opposed to at t = 1. A
longer time lag increases the working capital needs associated with a transaction and increases the probability
of contract default. More speci￿cally, the probability a contract is enforced in each period is i:i:d:and equal
to ￿j in country j, so that the probability that a contract is still binding at t = T is equal to
￿
￿j
￿T
. For
simplicity, this section also rules out the possibility of misbehavior on the part of the exporter by assuming
￿X = 1, so that letters of credit are a dominated ￿nancing mode.
Cash in advance terms are preferred to post shipment terms if and only if
￿
(￿i)
T +
￿
1 ￿ (￿i)
T
￿
￿X
￿
(1 + rj)
T >
￿￿
￿j
￿T
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿j
￿T￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
(1 + ri)
T
in the exogenous ￿nancing costs case, and if and only if
(￿i)
T +
￿
1 ￿ (￿i)
T
￿
￿X >
￿
1 + ￿j
1 + ￿i
￿T
￿
￿j
￿T
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿j
￿T￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
￿j
￿T
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿j
￿T￿
￿B
(B.1)
in the endogenous ￿nancing costs case.
In the above expressions, the e⁄ect of distance is a combination of the negative e⁄ect of ￿ij on ￿X (￿ij),
as in the main text, and the e⁄ect working through the time lag T, which is assumed to increase in distance.
Without having to specify the exact dependence of T on distance, it is clear that the overall dependence of
the relative pro￿tability of cash in advance terms on distance is complex in this environment.
For instance, consider the case in which ￿X = 1, so that (B.1) reduces to
￿
1 + ￿i
1 + ￿j
￿T
>
￿
￿j
￿T
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿j
￿T￿
￿X (￿ij)
￿
￿j
￿T
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿j
￿T￿
￿B
:
The right-hand-side of this inequality falls with distance both on account of the term ￿X (￿ij) as in the main
text, but also (provided that ￿B > ￿X (￿ij)) on account of the new channel explored here. In the plausible
case in which ￿j > ￿i, the left-hand-side of this inequality also is decreasing in T, re￿ ecting the intuition
that longer working capital requirements create incentives to obtain capital in the environment in which the
technological e¢ ciency of the banking sector is higher. The overall e⁄ect of distance on the inequality thus
depends on subtle features of a transaction.
This alternative approach to incorporating the e⁄ects of distance does not cleanly generate Proposition
2 because the cross-partial derivative of
￿
￿j
￿T
with respect to ￿j and T is only positive for large enough ￿j.
In sum, although there are reasons to believe that distance might have e⁄ects through channels di⁄erent
from the one explored in the main text, the patterns unveiled in the empirical analysis of the paper cannot
be easily explained in a variant of the model in which distance only increases the time between when goods
are shipped by the exporter and when the importer receives them.
7C Asymmetric Learning in the Dynamic Model of Trade Finance
The dynamic version of the model in the main text makes the assumption that the exporter and the importer￿ s
bank update their beliefs on the importer￿ s type in a symmetric fashion. The trade credit literature has
argued that, in some cases, sellers might have a comparative advantage, relative to ￿nancial intermediaries,
in learning about the trustworthiness of their buyers.
One way to incorporate this feature into the model is to assume that the importer￿ s bank has a worse
understanding of the industry than the exporter and, in particular, believes that the size of liquidity shocks
is always large enough to induce all agents, not just myopic ones, to default. In this case, a bank believes
that the importer defaults with a probability equal to ￿, the average default rate across importers in the
country, and it does not update this expected default rate based on the importer￿ s past history of defaults.
As a result, the ￿nancial constraint faced by the importer is not relaxed over time, and the pro￿tability of
cash in advance terms for the exporter does not increase with the length of the relationship between the
exporter and the importer, conditional on no defaults. In particular, the pro￿ts associated with a cash in
advance transaction in a relationship of length T with no prior defaults is given by
￿CIA
ij (T) = max
xj
(￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿B))
￿
R(xj;￿)
1 + ￿j
￿ ￿ijxj ￿ fij
)
. (C.1)
regardless of T. Pro￿ts under post shipment terms would however continue to vary with T because the
exporter is assumed to update his belief on the importer￿ s type by observing his history of defaults. More
speci￿cally, with our maintained assumption that the exporter is not credit constrained, and thus ri = ￿, the
pro￿ts associated with a post shipment term transaction in a relationship of length T with no prior defaults
are given by
￿PST
ij (T) = max
xj
(￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(b ￿(T) + (1 ￿ b ￿(T))(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿X (￿ij)))
￿
R(xj;￿)
1 + ￿i
￿ ￿ijxj ￿ fij
)
,
(C.2)
just as in the main text.
Comparing equations (C.2) and (C.1), reveals that:
Proposition C.1 The likelihood that a transaction with a particular importer occurs on post shipment terms
increases with the number of past interactions between the exporter and that particular importer. Further-
more, in importing countries where contractual enforcement is close to perfect, that is when ￿j ! 1, the e⁄ect
of past interactions on the relative pro￿tability of transactions that occur on post shipment terms vanishes.
This result is a slightly stronger version of Proposition 4 in the main text. The ￿rst statement does not
require conditions on the relative size of ￿B and ￿X (￿ij). Because b ￿
0 (T) > 0 and b ￿(0) = ￿, this variant of
the model also delivers a higher likelihood of the use of post shipment terms than that variant in the paper.
Because the exporter is assumed to have a comparative advantage, relative to ￿nancial intermediaries, in
learning about the trustworthiness of its buyers, the exporter is a more natural source of ￿nancing for
transactions.
D Equilibrium Prices and the Model of Trade Finance
This section discusses the implications of the model for the prices that are charged in transactions that are
￿nanced in di⁄erent ways and provides empirical evidence of these implications. The model predicts that,
8holding constant the volume of sales, prices should be set higher in post shipment term transactions than in
cash in advance transactions, especially for transactions with customers in countries with weak contractual
enforcement. Analysis of price data for the transactions studied in the main text yield results consistent
with these predictions.
D.1 Prices in the Theory
It is informative to begin by comparing the price that the exporter would charge to the importer under
di⁄erent ￿nancing modes while holding all the model parameters ￿xed.2 The data that are analyzing corre-
spond to the particular transaction price that the exporter and the importer agree to in the initial contract
at t = 0.
For the case of cash in advance terms, the exporter charges an ex-ante amount equal to PCIA
0 , pinned
down by
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
PCIA
0;ij ￿
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)R(xj;￿),
so the implied price (revenue per unit) is
pCIA
j =
PCIA
0
xCIA
j
=
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
(￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿X)
1 + ￿j
R
￿
xCIA
j ;￿
￿
xCIA
j
. (D.1)
In the case of post shipment terms transactions, the price agreed at t = 0 is the one that the exporter
expects to obtain if the contract is enforced in the importing country. In that case, the exporter demands a
payment equal to the total sales receipts obtained at t = 1, implying a price of
pPST
j =
R
￿
xPST
j ;￿
￿
xPST
j
: (D.2)
A comparison of the two prices in (D.1) and (D.2) is not completely straightforward because revenues
are generally not equal across ￿nancing modes even for common parameter values. Notice, however, that
holding constant the volume of sales xj, it is clear that prices are higher in post shipment transactions than
in cash in advance transactions. There are three reasons for this. First, because of the potential for exporter
misbehavior, the expected quality of goods is lower in cash in advance transactions (i.e., ￿X < 1). Second,
limited commitment problems increase the probability that actual payments are only a fraction of promised
payments in post shipment transactions. A third factor reducing the price of cash in advance transactions
relative to post shipment term transactions relates to the higher cost of funds faced by the importer in cash
in advance transactions (i.e., ￿j > 0), which again limits the extent to which the exporter can extract surplus
from the importer.3
Notice also that, again holding constant the value of sales, the di⁄erence in prices pPST
j ￿ pCIA
j is
predicted to be lower when contractual enforcement is stronger in the importer￿ s country. Furthermore,
larger transactions should be associated with lower prices.
2This raises the question of why, in light of the model, one might observe both cash in advance and post shipment terms
transactions given the same parameter values. It would be straightforward to add a source of idiosyncratic preferences for
particular ￿nancing modes into our model so as to generate the observed heterogeneity in the data.
3It may seem surprising that the cost of funds faced by the exporter is not a relevant factor in the comparison of prices.
This parameter would be central to a comparison of prices that left the exporter indi⁄erent between ￿nancing modes. Yet,
because the exporter is assumed to make take-it-or-leave-it-o⁄ers to importers, its indi⁄erence between terms is irrelevant in the
computation of prices. In variants of the model with a more balanced distribution of bargaining power, the wedge between the
two prices would also be a⁄ected by the cost of funds of the exporter. Although a strong one, the assumption of full bargaining
power on the part of the exporter allows the focus to be on variation in price gaps stemming from importer characteristics,
which maps to variation observed in the data that are analyzed.
9Finally, it is informative to consider prices in letter of credit transactions. These are determined in a
manner similar to prices in cash in advance transactions. Following analogous steps to those used to derive
equation (D.1) reveals
pLC
j =
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
￿B
￿
 j
￿
1 + ￿j
￿
R
￿
xLC
j ;￿
￿
xLC
j
.
Because  j > 1, prices in letter of credit transactions should be lower than prices in post shipment term
transactions, but the relative magnitude of prices in letter of credit transactions and cash in advance trans-
actions is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the processing fees, as captured by  j, and the
scope for misbehavior on the part of the exporter, as re￿ ected by ￿X.
D.2 Prices in the Data
The theory generates several predictions about prices. Speci￿cally, the prices charged for goods sold on post
shipment terms should be higher than the prices charged on cash in advance terms. The di⁄erences in these
prices should be larger in transactions in which the importer is located in a country with weak contractual
enforcement, re￿ ecting the higher probability of default in open account transactions with such importers.
In addition, the prices of goods sold on letter of credit terms should be similar to those of goods sold on cash
in advance terms. Finally, all prices should be appear to be lower in larger transactions.
Appendix Table 1 presents the results of tests of these hypotheses. These tests do not intend to pinpoint
any kind of causality; they aim to describe average prices for sales that occur on di⁄erent terms, conditional
on the value of sales, and to exhibit the correlation between prices and the size of a transaction. The
dependent variable is the actual price paid per pound, and each speci￿cation includes a ￿xed e⁄ect for each
product/country/incoterm/year combination.4 Products that are classi￿ed as ￿Other￿products in the data
are dropped from the sample for this analysis because they include a wide variety of items. The speci￿cation
presented in the ￿rst column includes a dummy for transactions that occur on letter of credit terms and a
dummy for transactions that occur on post shipment terms so that the coe¢ cients on these dummies re￿ ect
average prices relative to the prices charged for transactions on cash in advance terms. The coe¢ cient on
the post shipment dummy is positive and marginally signi￿cant, indicating that prices changed in these
transactions are $0.0293 higher than prices charged in cash in advance transactions. The second column
adds a control for the log of the value of sales. The coe¢ cient on this variable is negative and signi￿cant,
indicating that larger transactions occur at lower prices. In this speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient on the post
shipment dummy is larger in magnitude and has a higher degree of statistical signi￿cance than in the previous
speci￿cation.
The third and fourth columns display speci￿cations that are similar to those in the ￿rst two columns,
but these also include the interaction of the letter of credit and post shipment dummies with a proxy for
the strength of contractual enforcement in the importer￿ s country, namely the common law dummy. The
positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the post shipment dummy in the fourth column implies that prices
charged in post shipment term transactions are higher than those charged in cash in advance terms for
importers in civil law countries, and the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction of the post
shipment dummy and the common law dummy indicates that this price di⁄erence is smaller for importers
in common law countries. In fact the magnitudes of these coe¢ cients are similar, which suggests that the
di⁄erence in these prices is negligible in common law countries. This ￿nding is consistent with the idea that
4The data contain information about which terms are used in each transaction. The results of the speci￿cations presented are
little changed if product/country/incoterm/year/month ￿xed e⁄ects are used, indicating that the results do not re￿ect patterns
in monthly price ￿uctuations. Incoterms terms refer to the international standard trade terms that govern which trading party
is responsible for which aspects of transport.
10prices of transactions that occur on open account terms re￿ ect the higher risk of importer default in weak
institutional environments. The coe¢ cients on the letter of credit dummy and interactions including it tend
not to be statistically signi￿cant throughout the table. Thus, the results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions.5
E Supplemental Results
This section brie￿ y discusses supplemental results that are referred to in the main text. Figures and tables
are described under the headings of the sections of the paper that mention them.
E.1 The Enforcement of Contracts, Distance, and Financing Terms
The speci￿cations used to generate the results presented in Table 4 include the log of distance, and Appendix
Table 2 presents the estimated coe¢ cients for this variable. These coe¢ cients are positive and signi￿cant
in explaining the choice between cash in advance and post shipment terms in 7 of 8 speci￿cations, and they
are positive and signi￿cant in explaining the choice between letter of credit and post shipment terms in 6 of
8 speci￿cations.
The model suggests a role for the technological e¢ ciency of the banking sector in the importer￿ s country,
which is denoted by ￿j and captures factors that are not related to contractual enforcement and a⁄ect funding
costs, but the speci￿cations presented in Table 4 do not include controls for this parameter. Appendix Table
3 displays the results of including a monthly measure of interbank interest rates in the speci￿cations that
appear in Table 4, and Appendix Table 4 displays the results of including a monthly measure of Central
Bank discount rates in those speci￿cations. The results are robust to including these additional controls. It
is worth noting that each of the measures of interest rates have shortcomings. Interbank rates are rates that
banks charge to one another, and these can be problematic because they partly re￿ ect the counterparty risks
of transacting with ￿nancial institutions. Central Bank discount rates are monetary policy tools, and their
level therefore re￿ ects macroeconomic conditions that go beyond an exporter￿ s costs of funds.
The results in Table 4 could be misleading if the amount of trade that takes place between the exporter
and importer or expected shipment times a⁄ect ￿nancing terms and if measures of institutional quality are
correlated with them. Appendix Table 5 present the results of running the speci￿cations in Table 4 while also
including controls for the log of the value of sales, the log of the volume of sales, the log of the sum of past
sales values from the exporter to the importer, and expected shipping times, which can be measured using
the data provided by the exporter. The results are little changed by including these additional controls.
Contractual enforcement might also be associated with the concentration of importers, and buyers might
have more bargaining power in concentrated markets in a manner that a⁄ects ￿nancing terms. Appendix
Table 6 displays the results of tests like those in Table 4 that include the Her￿ndahl index of sales to each
country in each year. Conditioning on this index does not materially a⁄ect the results.
Figure 8 illustrates ￿ndings implied by multinomial logit speci￿cations that capture the e⁄ect of the
strength of contractual enforcement interacted with distance on the choice of ￿nancing terms. Coe¢ cients
on interaction terms in multinomial logit speci￿cations are hard to interpret. It is also possible to consider the
impact of the interaction of measures of contractual enforcement and distance in linear probability models,
which are not subject to the same interpretation challenges. Appendix Table 7 presents the results of such
5While it is tempting to use prices to calculate implied interest rates associated with di⁄erent ￿nancing terms, the data do
include information about when payments actually occur, and the details of this timing are ambiguous for several ￿nancing
terms. Rough estimates suggest that credit supplied by the exporter carries a high implied annualized interest rate, which is
consistent with estimates of the cost of trade credit in papers like Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999).
11tests. The use of post shipment terms appears to increase with the level of contractual enforcement for more
remote customers but not for nearby customers. These ￿ndings are consistent with the patterns in Figure 8.
E.2 Relationships
Table 5 of the paper presents tests of the predictions that importers that have traded more extensively with
the exporter in the past should be more likely to transact on post shipment terms and less likely to transact
on cash in advance terms and that the strength of contractual enforcement should reduce the impact of the
development of an extensive trading relationship.
The linear probability models presented in Table 5 have the advantages of being able to accommodate
a large number of ￿xed e⁄ects and of producing estimated coe¢ cients on interaction terms are easier to
interpret than estimates produced by multinomial logit speci￿cations. However, these models have some of
their own shortcomings, such as the fact that probabilities are not bounded between zero and one. Appendix
Figure 1 illustrates results implied by running the speci￿cations in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5 as a
multinomial logit speci￿cation. Panel A shows the estimated probability of using cash in advance terms in
common and civil law countries for di⁄erent value of the log of the count of the number of prior transactions
between the exporter and an importer. The use of prepayment terms is more likely in civil law than common
law countries, and prepayment terms appear to be used less frequently as the importer transacts more
with the exporter. The decline in the use of prepayment terms as a relationship develops is particularly
pronounced for importers based in civil law countries. Panel B depicts estimate probabilities of the use of
post shipment terms, and the patterns complement those in Panel A. Post shipment terms are more prevalent
when importers are based in common law countries, and their use increases as a relationship develops between
the exporter and importer, especially when importers are based in civil law countries. The standard error
bars indicate that estimates of the use of prepayment terms for importers in common law countries that
have not transacted much with the exporter are imprecise. These patterns are consistent with the results in
Table 5 of the paper.
The dynamic version of the model that is used to motivate the analysis in Table 5 does not account for
transactions that occur on letter of credit terms. Appendix Table 8 presents the results of tests that remove
letter of credit transactions from the sample and run the speci￿cations in that appear in columns 5 and 6
of Table 5 of the revised paper. These results are similar to and slightly stronger statistically than those
presented in the paper.
The tests in Table 5 use a dummy equal to one for common law countries to capture the strength of
contractual enforcement. Appendix Table 9 presents the speci￿cations similar to the one in column 5 of Table
5, except each of the measures of contractual enforcement used in Table 4 are considered. As predicted by
the theory, the e⁄ect of the development of a trading relationship increases the use of post shipment terms,
and this e⁄ect is, in statistical and economic terms, less important in countries with strong contractual
enforcement for 5 of the 8 measures.
E.3 The Crisis
Appendix Figure 2 illustrates results implied by running the speci￿cations in the columns 2, 4, and 6 of
Table 7 as a multinomial logit speci￿cation. Panel A indicates that the estimated probability that payment
terms are prepayment terms is slightly higher for new customers than for other customers outside of the
crisis period. The estimated probability that payment terms are prepayment terms increase slightly for new
customers during the crisis, but it is virtually unchanged for other customers. Panel B shows that the use
of post shipment terms is lower for new customers than other customers outside of the crisis period, and
12that the di⁄erential use of these terms by the two groups of customers becomes bigger during the crisis. The
estimated changes in the terms used by new customers during the crisis are not huge, but these patterns are
consistent with the results that appear in Table 7.
Table 7 of the paper considers how the treatment of new customers changes during the crisis, and it is
possible to analyze whether these changes vary with the level of contractual enforcement. Appendix Table
10 displays the results of running the tests that appear in the even columns of Table 7 on two subsets of the
data, observations of importers based in common law countries and observations of importers based in civil
law countries. The coe¢ cients on the interaction of the dummy equal to one for new customers interacted
with the dummy equal to one during the crisis are only signi￿cant for transactions with importers based
in civil law countries. These ￿ndings imply that the increase in the use of cash in advance terms and the
decrease in the use of post shipment terms for transactions involving new customers during the crisis is
focused in countries with weak contractual enforcement. It is easy to demonstrate that this result is implied
by our theory. In particular, for new customers T = 0, and the relative pro￿tability of post shipment terms
and cash in advance depends on the ratio
￿ =
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿X (￿ij)))
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿B))
:
Straightforward di⁄erentiation delivers
@￿
@￿
=
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿B ￿ ￿X (￿ij))
￿
￿j +
￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿B))
￿2,
from which it follows that @
2￿
@￿@￿j > 0, and thus the lower is ￿j, the bigger is the e⁄ect of a higher ￿ (a crisis)
on the relative appeal of extending post shipment terms to new customers.
13Panel A: Estimated Probability of Cash in Advance Terms
Panel B: Estimated Probability of Post Shipment Terms
Appendix Figure 1
Effects of Relationships on Financing Terms: Multinomial Logit Estimates
Notes: This figure displays the estimated probabilities of the use of alternative payment terms as a function of the log of the count of prior 
transactions for customers based in common and civil law countries.  Panel A illustrates estimated probabilities that terms are cash in 
advance terms, and Panel B illustrates estimated probabilities that terms are post shipment terms.  The estimates are obtained by running 
the specification that appears in the even columns of Table 6 as a multinomial logit specification.  Error bars illustrate 95% confidence 
intervals computed on the basis of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the customer level.
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Appendix Figure 2
Financing Terms for New Customers: Multinomial Logit Estimates
Notes: This figure displays the estimated probabilities of the use of alternative payment terms as a function of whether a customer is a new 
customer and whether the customer is based in a common or civil law country.  Panel A illustrates estimated probabilities that terms are 
cash in advance terms, and Panel B illustrates estimated probabilities that terms are post shipment terms.  The estimates are obtained by 
running the specifications that appear in the even columns of Table 7 as a multinomial logit specification.  Error bars illustrate 95% 
confidence intervals computed on the basis of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the customer level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0008 0.0386 -0.0007 0.0388
(0.0213) -0.0241 (0.0238) (0.0272)
-0.0388 -0.0430
(0.0523) (0.0478)
0.0293 0.0570 0.0467 0.0767
(0.0175)* (0.0188)*** (0.0212)** (0.0226)***
-0.0825 -0.0935
(0.0337)** (0.0328)***
-0.1534 -0.1537
(0.0376)*** (0.0376)***
Product/Country/Incoterms/Year Fixed 
Effects? YYYY
No. of Obs. 441,291 441,291 439,716 439,716
R-Squared 0.5265 0.5415 0.5261 0.5412
Appendix Table 1
Financing Terms and Prices
Notes: The dependent variable is the price charged per pound of goods sold.  Letter of Credit Dummy is a dummy equal to one for transactions that 
occur on letter of credit terms, and Post Shipment Dummy is a dummy for transactions that occur on post shipment terms.  Common Law Dummy 
is a dummy equal to one for common law countries.  Log of Sales Value measures the value of sales in dollars.  Each specification is an OLS 
specification that includes a fixed effect for each product/country/incoterm/year combination.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that 
correct for clustering at the product/country/incoterm/year level appear in parentheses.  The "other" category of products is omitted from the data.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Price per Pound
Letter of Credit Dummy
Letter of Credit Dummy * Common Law 
Dummy
Post Shipment Dummy
Post Shipment Dummy * Common Law 
Dummy
Log of Sales ValueType of Financing Terms:
Cash in Advance vs. Post 
Shipment
Letter of Credit vs. Post 
Shipment
Cash in Advance vs. 
Letter of Credit
Common Law Dummy 1.5575 1.1606 0.3969
(0.5318)*** (0.8842) (0.9858)
Contract Viability 1.2625 0.5247 0.7378
(0.5927)** (0.9842) (1.0784)
Payment Delay 1.8342 1.0979 0.7363
(0.5980)*** (0.5840)* (0.6140)
Enforceability of Contracts 1.3444 1.4976 -0.1532
(0.7502)* (0.5540)*** (0.8082)
Confidence in Legal System 2.1235 0.6077 1.5158
(0.6968)*** (0.2920)** (0.6933)**
Duration of Legal Procedure 1.7688 2.0885 -0.3197
(0.6269)*** (0.5316)*** (0.6564)
Private Credit 0.5171 1.3552 -0.8381
(0.5571) (0.3875)*** (0.5571)
Stock Market Capitalization 1.6421 1.8864 -0.2443
(0.7321)** (0.5020)*** (0.8638)
Appendix Table 2
Financing Terms and Enforcement of Contacts: Distance Coefficients
Notes: This table presents the coefficients on log distance that are estimated in the specifications that appear in Table 4 of the paper.  The variables 
in the first column refer to the measure of contractual enforcement used in the specification.Type of Financing Terms:
Cash in Advance vs. Post 
Shipment
Letter of Credit vs. Post 
Shipment
Cash in Advance vs. 
Letter of Credit
Common Law Dummy -3.3862 -3.2950 -0.0912
(0.5188)*** (0.9403)*** (1.0946)
Contract Viability -2.4570 -1.1119 -1.3452
(0.5847)*** (0.5531)** (0.5460)**
Payment Delay -1.1335 -1.7151 0.5816
(0.7291) (0.8403)** (0.8103)
Enforceability of Contracts -0.7398 -0.6867 -0.0532
(0.3072)** (0.2732)** (0.3887)
Confidence in Legal System -1.6224 -0.7156 -0.9068
(0.4898)*** (0.3168)** (0.4023)**
Duration of Legal Procedure -0.0003 0.0018 -0.0021
(0.0024) (0.0010)* (0.0025)
Private Credit -2.0665 -0.5396 -1.5270
(0.7190)*** (0.4065) (0.5772)***
Stock Market Capitalization -1.9715 -2.1684 0.1969
(0.6048)*** (0.6382)*** (0.9037)
Appendix Table 3
Financing Terms and Enforcement of Contacts: Controlling for Interbank Interest Rates
Notes: The specifications presented in this table are the same as those in Table 4 of the paper, except they also include a control for interbank 
interest rates. Interbank interest rates are drawn from the Global Financial Data database.Type of Financing Terms:
Cash in Advance vs. Post 
Shipment
Letter of Credit vs. Post 
Shipment
Cash in Advance vs. 
Letter of Credit
Common Law Dummy -3.3360 -3.5202 0.1842
(0.4721)*** (0.9768)*** (1.1632)
Contract Viability -3.2790 -1.4703 -1.8087
(0.6462)*** (0.7726)* (0.6745)***
Payment Delay -1.7270 -1.9206 0.1936
(0.8158)** (0.9944)* (0.8166)
Enforceability of Contracts -1.1181 -0.9726 -0.1454
(0.3651)*** (0.3909)** (0.4916)
Confidence in Legal System -1.2186 -0.4486 -0.7701
(0.4297)*** (0.3158) (0.3778)**
Duration of Legal Procedure -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0018
(0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0030)
Private Credit -2.6662 -0.3135 -2.3526
(0.6147)*** (0.3542) (0.6795)***
Stock Market Capitalization -1.5018 -2.5487 1.0469
(0.7002)** (0.8710)** (1.2066)
Appendix Table 4
Financing Terms and Enforcement of Contacts: Controlling for Central Bank Discount Rates
Notes: The specifications presented in this table are the same as those in Table 4 of the paper, except they also include a control for central bank 
discount rates. Central bank discount rates are drawn from the Global Financial Data database.Type of Financing Terms:
Cash in Advance vs. Post 
Shipment
Letter of Credit vs. Post 
Shipment
Cash in Advance vs. 
Letter of Credit
Common Law Dummy -3.3192 -2.3517 -0.9675
(0.6936)*** (0.7410)*** (1.0645)
Contract Viability -2.7462 -2.2177 -0.5285
(0.4706)*** (0.8913)** (0.8342)
Payment Delay -1.2308 -2.1363 0.9055
(0.5891)** (0.8929)** (0.8430)
Enforceability of Contracts -0.3981 -0.4461 0.0480
(0.3139) (0.3335) (0.4862)
Confidence in Legal System -1.1622 -0.8627 -0.2995
(0.3474)*** (0.2018)*** (0.3965)
Duration of Legal Procedure -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0017
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0029)
Private Credit -2.0925 0.2400 -2.3424
(0.7037)*** (0.5467) (0.7718)***
Stock Market Capitalization -1.2564 -0.7830 -0.4734
(0.5476)** (0.7213) (0.8773)
Appendix Table 5
Financing Terms and Enforcement of Contacts: Additional Controls
Notes: This table presents specifications like those presented in Table 4 of the paper, except these specifications include additional controls for the 
Log of Sales Value, the Log of Sales Volume, the Log of Previous Sales, and the Expected Shipping Time.  Log of Sales Value and Log of Sales 
Volume measure the value of sales in dollars and the volume of sales in pounds.  Log of Previous Sales is the log of aggregate sales to a customer 
location prior to a transaction.  Expected Shipping Time is the difference in days between the expected date of departure of goods and the expected 
date of their arrival at the customer's location.Type of Financing Terms:
Cash in Advance vs. Post 
Shipment
Letter of Credit vs. Post 
Shipment
Cash in Advance vs. 
Letter of Credit
Common Law Dummy -3.3276 -3.0564 -0.2712
(0.4865)*** (0.7933)*** (0.9800)
Contract Viability -2.6625 -2.3697 -0.2928
(0.5022)*** (0.7317)*** (0.6793)
Payment Delay -1.4880 -2.2027 0.7147
(0.5691)*** (0.8381)*** (0.7965)
Enforceability of Contracts -0.6706 -0.8622 0.1916
(0.3192)** (0.3774)** (0.4650)
Confidence in Legal System -1.2830 -0.8401 -0.4429
(0.3982)*** (0.2349)*** (0.3020)
Duration of Legal Procedure 0.0011 0.0037 -0.0026
(0.0023) (0.0037)** (0.0026)
Private Credit -2.0988 -0.3106 -1.7883
(0.6357)*** (0.4745) (0.6609)***
Stock Market Capitalization -1.6827 -1.5908 -0.0919
(0.6120)*** (0.8066)** (0.9590)
Appendix Table 6
Financing Terms and Enforcement of Contacts: Controlling for the Herfindahl Index of Sales
Notes: This table presents specifications like those presented in Table 4 of the paper, except these specifications also include the Herfindahl index 
of sales to each country in each year.Dependent Variable:
Measure of Contractual 
Enforcement:
Common Law 
Dummy
Contract 
Viability
Payment Delay
Enforceability of 
Contracts
Confidence in 
Legal System
Duration of 
Legal Procedure
Private Credit
Stock Market 
Capitalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contractual Enforcement 0.1195 0.1568 0.0975 -0.0002 -0.1529 0.0004 0.0461 -0.0318
(0.0686)* (0.1486) (0.0849) (0.0103) (0.2157) (0.0002)*** (0.0277)* (0.0468)
Long Distance -0.5669 -1.1610 -1.1030 -1.6381 -1.5512 -0.2428 -0.6084 -0.7347
(0.0901)*** (0.5706)** (0.3321)*** (0.2842)*** (0.8905)* (0.1142)** (0.1434)*** (0.0653)***
0.4770 0.2443 0.2117 0.1911 0.2777 -0.0013 0.4144 0.3472
(0.0936)*** (0.1484) (0.0974)** (0.0361)*** (0.2152) (0.0005)** (0.1161)*** (0.0666)***
Log of GDP per Capita 0.0773 0.0549 0.055 0.0342 0.1974 0.1698 0.0016 0.1104
(0.0231)*** -0.034 (0.0452) (0.0345) (0.0415)*** (0.0359)*** (0.0303) (0.0363)***
Product Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
No. of Obs. 592,812 491,737 491,737 522,825 525,560 562,460 320,085 352,529
R-Squared 0.6539 0.6469 0.6288 0.6110 0.6649 0.5845 0.3818 0.6066
Appendix Table 7
Financing Terms, Enforcement of Contracts, and Distance
Dummy if Post Shipment Terms
Notes: This table displays linear probability specifications in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for transactions that are conducted on post shipment terms.  Common Law Dummy is a dummy 
equal to one for countries with a common law legal origin.  Contract Viability is drawn from the International Country Risk Guide, and it measures the risk of contract modification or cancellation with higher values 
indicating lower risks.   Payment Delay is also drawn from the International Country Risk Guide, and it measures the risk of receiving and exporting payments from a country with higher values indicating lower 
risks.  Enforceability of Contracts comes from Knack and Keefer (1995), and it captures the degree to which contractual agreements are honored with higher values indicating higher enforcement.  Confidence in 
Legal System is drawn from a World Bank Survey of managers on the degree to which they believe the system will uphold contracts and property rights in a business dispute, and higher values imply greater 
confidence.  Duration of Legal Procedure is taken from Djankov et al. (2003), and it measures the total estimated duration in calendar days to pursue a claim on a bounced check.  Private Credit is the ratio of private 
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, and Stock Market Capitalization is the  value of listed shares to GDP.  Long Distance is a dummy equal to one for international transactions in 
which the capital city of the sales destination is further from Washington, DC than the mean international transaction.  Each specification includes product fixed effects, and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors that correct for clustering at the country level appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Contractual Enforcement * 
Long DistanceDependent Variable:
(1) (2)
0.0234
(0.0086)***
-0.0220
(0.0097)**
0.0192
(0.0066)***
-0.0194
(0.0078)**
0.0000 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005)
0.0004 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0007)
-0.0010 0.0094
(0.0630) (0.0617)
Customer/Country Fixed Effects? Y Y
Product Fixed Effects? Y Y
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y
No. of Obs. 558,173 558,215
R-Squared 0.9524 0.9521
Log of Previous Sales * Common Law Dummy
Appendix Table 8
Effects of Relationships on Financing Terms: Dropping Letter of Credit Transactions
Notes: The specifications presented in this table are similar to those presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, except transactions that 
involve letters of credit have been dropped from the sample.
Dummy if Post Shipment Terms
Log of Previous Sales
Log of Number of Previous Transactions
Log of Number of Previous Transactions * Common Law Dummy
Log of Sales Value
Log of Sales Volume
Log of GDP per CapitaDependent Variable:
Measure of Contractual 
Enforcement:
Common Law 
Dummy
Contract 
Viability
Payment Delay
Enforceability of 
Contracts
Confidence in 
Legal System
Duration of 
Legal Procedure
Private Credit
Stock Market 
Capitalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0186 0.0125 0.0125 0.0211 0.0362 0.0069 0.0247 0.0157
(0.0087)** (0.0054)** (0.0053)** (0.0085)** (0.0105)*** -0.0060 (0.0081)*** (0.0071)**
-0.0184 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0230 -0.0393 0.0061 -0.0267 -0.0134
(0.0095)* (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0088)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0074) (0.0069)*** (0.0075)*
-0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006)
0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
0.0175 0.0339 0.0342 -0.1102 0.0409 0.0358 0.0653 0.0278
(0.0611) (0.0584) (0.0576) (0.0486)** (0.0483) (0.0597) (0.0718) (0.0590)
Customer/Country Fixed Effect YYYYYYYY
Product Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
No. of Obs. 567,313 551,584 551,584 501,149 503,571 538,211 501,427 540,319
R-Squared 0.9426 0.9476 0.9476 0.9577 0.9534 0.9480 0.8888 0.9502
Log of Sales Value
Log of Sales Volume
Log of GDP per Capita
Appendix Table 9
Effects of Relationships on Financing Terms: Alternative Measures of the Strength of Contract Enforcement
Notes: The specifications presented in this table are similar to those presented in column 5 of Table 5 of the paper, except a variety of measures of the strength of contract enforcement are used in the interaction term.  
These measures are country average values of the eight measures used in Table 4 of the paper.
Dummy if Post Shipment Terms
Log of Previous Sales
Log of Previous Sales * 
Contractual EnforcementDependent Variable:
Type of Country Common Law Civil Law Common Law Civil Law Common Law Civil Law
\
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.1386 0.0884 0.0261 0.0166 -0.1647 -0.1050
(0.0174)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0091)* (0.0179)*** (0.0151)***
-0.0024 0.0123 -0.0005 0.0022 0.0029 -0.0145
(0.0016) (0.0098) (0.0006) (0.0040) (0.0016)* (0.0097)
-0.0460 0.0962 -0.0089 0.0230 0.0548 -0.1193
(0.0655) (0.0394)** (0.0164) (0.0214) (0.0660) (0.0399)***
-0.0007 -0.0233 0.0008 0.0034 0.0000 0.0199
(0.0017) (0.0106)** (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0110)*
0.0018 0.0039 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0041
(0.0012) (0.0052) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0052)
0.0870 0.0725 -0.0875 0.0236 0.0004 -0.0961
(0.0599) (0.0608) (0.0648) (0.0243) (0.0887) (0.0622)
Country Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Product Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYY
No. of Obs. 408,691 161,946 408,691 161,946 408,691 161,946
R-Squared 0.2537 0.6972 0.0896 0.5513 0.2475 0.6625
Appendix Table 10
Financing Terms for New Customers: Results for Common and Civil Law Countries
Notes: This table presents the results of the tests in the even columns of Table 7 using two subsets of the data.  The first is observations for importers based in common law countries, and the second 
is observations for importers based in civil law countries.
Dummy if Cash in Advance Terms Dummy if Letter of Credit Terms Dummy if Post Shipment Terms
New Customer Dummy
Crisis Dummy
New Customer Dummy * Crisis Dummy
Log of Sales Value
Log of Sales Volume
Log of GDP per Capita